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Abstract 
 
Chinese urban workers are no longer shielded from market forces. They are 
bearing the brunt of the adjustment costs as enterprises shed redundant workers. This 
paper focuses on the role of education in determining labor market outcomes in China’s 
rapidly changing urban labor environment. The empirical work, based on enterprise and 
worker survey data gathered in the fall of 1999 and spring of 2000, demonstrates that 
education is a key determinant of labor market outcomes. Educational attainment is an 
important and significant factor in the lay-off decision—the more education a worker has 
the better his/ her protection from lay off. Similarly, the more education a worker has the 
better his/her chances of finding new employment once laid off. The human capital 
accumulation of re-employed workers is rewarded more, as measured in terms of 
incremental earnings for each additional year of schooling, than that of continuously 
employed workers. 
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Introduction 
 
This paper focuses on the role of education in determining labor market outcomes 
in China’s rapidly changing urban labor environment. In particular, the role of education 
in both preventing lay-offs and aiding in the re-employment of urban residents is 
examined. A weighted bivariate probit model is used to examine the factors (including 
both incremental schooling and job training) that affect the probability of lay-off. The 
contributions of these same factors to the probability of re-employment once laid-off are 
then assessed in a re-employment probit model. Finally, the role of education in the 
earnings determination of re-employed workers is compared to that of workers who have 
never been laid off. 
  The empirical work will demonstrate that education is a key determinant of labor 
market outcomes. Educational attainment is an important and significant factor in the lay-
off decision—the more education a worker has the better his/ her protection from lay off. 
Similarly, the more education a worker has the better his/her chances of finding new 
employment once laid off. The human capital accumulation of re-employed workers is 
rewarded more, as measured in terms of incremental earnings for each additional year of 
schooling, than that of continuously employed workers. 
Background 
 
China's pre-reform labor system was the antithesis of free market. The state 
claimed ownership of labor services and bureaucratically assigned workers to enterprises 
for life. Workers’ preferences concerning occupation or location mattered little. On the 
enterprise side, managers for the most part had to accept any and all workers allocated to William Davidson Institute Working Paper 459 
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them. Pay rates were nearly equal regardless of worker effort, productivity, or 
performance. 
Concerns about open unemployment and social instability caused the Chinese 
leadership to embark on a slow, evolutionary transition to a market economy. In the mid-
1990s concerns about state-sector inefficiency began to override concerns about 
dismissals and layoffs. The policy of putting workers on xiagang, a form of layoff in 
which workers were placed on inactive status and sent home with small stipends was first 
experimented with and then applied nation-wide in 1997. The implementation of this 
policy coincided with the unexpected financial crisis and slowdown of growth in Asian 
economies.  
The effects were profound. By the end of 1997 while the official unemployment 
(shiye) rate increased to 3.1% of the urban labor force, that is, 5.8 million people (China 
Labour Statistical Yearbook, 1998) an additional 11.5 to 15 million workers were 
suspended from their jobs.
1 Official statistics suggest that by the end of 1999 a total of 
25.2 million workers had been laid-off (put on xiagang) and that 9.4 million workers still 
remained in the ranks of the laid-off (China Labour Statistical Yearbook, 1999, 2000). 
The plight of these displaced urban workers was compounded by large numbers of rural 
migrants seeking work. The loosening of migration restrictions in the mid-1980s allowed 
rural residents to look for work in urban areas and rural-to-urban migration subsequently 
snowballed. In 1996 approximately 45 million workers sought employment in cities 
(Rural Development Institute, 1998). The security once enjoyed by urban workers rapidly 
                                                 
1 Li [1997:9] reports State Statistical Bureau estimates of 15 million employees made redundant, and Li 
[1998: 9] quotes the former Minister of Labor, Li Boyong, as reporting a figure of 11.51 million laid-off in 
1997, of which 7.87 million were from state-owned enterprises. 
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eroded. If one describes the early reform policies as causing rust on the iron rice bowl 
then the 1997 xiagang policies should be described as totally smashing it.  
  Chinese urban workers are no longer shielded from market forces. They bear the 
brunt of the adjustment costs as enterprises shed redundant workers in their attempts to 
become more efficient and profitable. Laid-off workers experience substantial periods of 
unemployment with minimal stipends (Appleton et al., 2001). Income inequality is 
widening. In the early reform period, increases in income inequality meant that those at 
the low end of the income distribution lost out relative to those at the high end of the 
distribution despite experiencing rising incomes. In the current period of massive layoffs 
those at the low end of the distribution are experiencing substantial reductions income. 
Their losses are absolute (Meng, 2001). 
  Enterprise restructuring is forcing workers to bear much of the cost of a very 
painful adjustment process. In one sense, this paper can be viewed as examining how 
these costs are distributed amongst workers who differ in terms of their educational 
attainments and acquisition of job training. Some of these workers are laid off while 
others keep their jobs. Some of the laid-off workers find new employment quickly while 
others do not. Some find their human capital well rewarded in terms of earnings while 
others do not. In another sense, this paper can be viewed as exploring the role of 
education and job training in determining the labor market outcomes of China’s urban 
residents in 1999-2000, a period in which workers faced both a great deal of uncertainty 
and a rapidly changing work environment.  
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The Data 
 
  The data used here were gathered in the fall of 1999 and spring of 2000 as part of 
the Urban Labor Market Integration Project.
2 The data set is rather unique in that it is 
enterprise based and ties together firm information with that of workers of three different 
categories: employed urban residents, laid-off urban residents, and employed migrants. 
Surveys were conducted at 118 enterprises, roughly 20 in each of Beijing, Nanjing, 
Wuhan, Xian, Tianjin, and Changchun. 
Industry type (hangye) was the primary selection criteria for inclusion of an 
enterprise in the survey process. In each city several textile, mechanical processing, and 
construction firms were selected. The remaining enterprises were chosen according to the 
industrial mix of each city. Secondary selection criteria dictated that, within an industry, 
enterprises be selected to provide firms differing in scale, measures of economic 
prosperity, and ownership. Firms known to have laid-off workers or to have both laid-off 
workers and hired migrants were deliberately over sampled. At the time of the survey, 83 
of the samples’ 118 enterprises had a number of laid off workers on their rolls.
3  
Approximately 800 individuals in each of the six cities mentioned above, each 
associated with one of the selected enterprises, were surveyed—4873 individuals in total. 
Once an enterprise was chosen for inclusion in the sample then roughly 15 workers of 
                                                 
2The Urban Labor Market Integration Project was funded by the Ford Foundation, Beijing Office and was 
carried out by principle investigators: Fang Cai (Population Institute, Chinese Academy of Social 
Sciences), Margaret Maurer-Fazio (Department of Economics, Bates College), Xin Meng (Research School 
of Pacific and Asian Studies, Australia National University), and Hansheng Wang (Department of 
Sociology, Beijing Univerisity). 
 
3 Approximately half the firms had both migrant and laid-off workers. About one third of the firms had 
laid-off workers but no migrant employees. A smaller number of the enterprises (approximately 15 percent) 
had hired migrants and had never laid-off members of their urban-resident work force. The remainder of 
the firms hired only urban residents and had no laid-off workers on their rolls. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 459 
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each type (employed urban resident, laid-off urban resident, and migrant) were selected. 
The employed urban residents were randomly chosen from those present at the job site at 
the time of the survey. The laid-off workers were called back to the enterprise to 
participate in the survey. This callback method introduces a potential source of bias into 
the sample—laid-off workers subsequently employed in other locations are most unlikely 
to have responded to the enterprise callback. Migrant workers were surveyed either at the 
job site or in their employer-provided dormitories. In all cases, survey overseers were 
present in the room while respondents completed the surveys. They were thus available to 
observe the process and answer questions. The worker surveys included questions 
regarding: background information, work history, income, expenditure, and attitudes.  
It is important to note that the workers designated here as “laid-off” (i.e., labeled 
as xiagang gong ren) are so designated because the enterprises that anchor the surveys 
identified them as such. Almost one third of these “laid-off” workers reported finding 
jobs subsequent to their lay-offs though only one quarter remained employed at the time 
of the survey. (Insert Table 1 here) 
Personal Background and Educational Attainment 
  Selected sample means and proportions from the worker surveys are reported in 
Table 1. Men make up 52 percent of the sample of employed urban residents and only 44 
percent of laid-off urban workers. There is little difference in age between the laid-off 
workers and the employed--the laid off-workers, at a mean age of 39, are about a year 
younger than their employed urban counterparts. Employed urban residents have a little 
more schooling than laid-off workers with means of 11.7 and 10.6 years of schooling, 
respectively. Over 8 percent of the currently/continuously employed have university William Davidson Institute Working Paper 459 
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educations while only 2.8 percent of the laid-off workers have attained this level of 
education. Although the majority of workers received some job training, the proportion of 
employed urban residents receiving such training was almost 17 percentage points higher 
than the proportion of laid-off workers. 
Monthly Income and Hourly Wages 
  The monthly income reported in Table 1 includes wages, subsidies, and bonuses 
but does not include the value of employer-provided benefits such as medical insurance, 
pension accruals, and housing. The pecuniary income of the urban workers (553 
yuan/month) considerably exceeds that from the last job before lay-off for the laid-off 
workers (417 yuan/ month). However, it should be noted that this mean income is a 
simple average of these workers last reported income regardless of the year in which it 
was earned. Over one third of the laid-off workers (37.7 percent) managed to find some 
type of work after being laid off and 27.4 percent reported still having a job at the time of 
the survey. The stated average monthly income of these re-employed workers at 571 
yuan/month exceeds that of their urban counterparts who have not yet experienced being 
laid-off. However, they work more hours per day (8.46) and more days per week (5.68) 
than urban workers who have never experienced a layoff. Consequently, their hourly 
wage at 3.10 yuan is lower than that received by their urban counterparts who have never 
been laid-off (3.37 yuan/hour). 
Enterprise Ownership, Job Classification and Job Position 
In this sample, approximately 80 percent of the urban residents work or used to 
work for state-owned enterprises. This proportion exceeds the national proportion of 
urban workers employed in state-owned enterprises by 9% (China Labour Statistical William Davidson Institute Working Paper 459 
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Yearbook, 2000, p.14) and is an artifact of the sampling procedure that was aimed in part 
towards surveying large numbers of laid-off urban workers.  
There is some variation in the method by which workers are paid with a higher 
proportion of the laid-off workers than the continuously employed reporting being on a 
fixed wage contract. At their last job before being laid off, 86 percent of laid-off workers 
received fixed wages, 8 percent were paid by piece rate and 5 percent were compensated 
on an hourly basis while 77 percent of the continuously employed urban workers 
received fixed wages, 9 percent were on piece rate and approximately 10 percent were 
paid on an hourly basis. Medical insurance was provided by employers to 49 percent of 
the never laid-off urban workers while 54 percent of the laid-off workers used to receive 
this benefit. 
Far fewer of the laid-off workers than the continuously employed report their 
latest job to be one from the higher rungs of the occupational scale—cadres, 
office/clerical workers, and engineers and technicians. The opposite is true for jobs at the 
lower rungs—higher proportions of the laid-off workers than those never laid off used to 
be production line workers, service workers, and sales workers.  
Structure of the Empirical Work 
 
Factors Affecting the Probability of Lay-Off 
 
  To explore the effects of human capital accumulation on the probability of an 
urban worker being laid-off I estimate a “within enterprise” probit model using a 
combined sample of all the workers with urban household registration (whether 
employed or laid-off) from enterprises reporting at least some lay-offs. The dependent 
variable is binary and set equal to one for all workers identified by the enterprise as ever William Davidson Institute Working Paper 459 
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having been laid-off. Since all the enterprises in our sample were in existence and 
involved in production at the time they were surveyed this means each laid-off worker 
was chosen for lay-off while others were not. (In no cases in our sample were all the 
workers of a firm laid-off.) 
  A note of caution is in order here. The sample employed here is not representative 
of the population of all workers in urban China. In each city enterprises were chosen in 
such a way to yield reasonably large and nearly equal numbers of employed urban 
residents, laid-off urban residents, and migrant workers. Given this sample design, it is 
necessary to weight the observations to reflect the probability that a given worker of a 
particular employment status (employed vs. laid-off) within a particular enterprise was 
included in our sample. Even with this weighting scheme, the lay-off probits need to be 
interpreted with care. For example, the marginal effect of an extra year of schooling 
should be interpreted as yielding the marginal effect of formal schooling in reducing the 
probability of lay-off within enterprises choosing workers for layoff.  
Which worker characteristics are likely to raise the probability of lay-off and 
which will reduce it? Characteristics that make a worker more productive should reduce 
the probability of lay-off, ceteris paribus. Therefore, both years of formal schooling and a 
“received training” dummy variable are used as explanatory variables. Firm-specific 
human capital may increase with tenure at an enterprise and thus a tenure variable is also 
included in the probit. A worker’s health status is likely to affect productivity, therefore, 
two health dummies are used as explanators—one to represent poor health and one to 
represent good health (both are relative to average health, the left-out category.)  William Davidson Institute Working Paper 459 
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Other factors that may influence the likelihood of lay-off include: age, party 
membership, gender, and marital status. In recent years women have tended to be laid off 
in higher proportions than men, and older women in higher proportions than younger 
women. It is not necessarily the case, however, that the characteristics of age and 
femaleness raise the probability of lay-off once human capital characteristics are 
controlled for. Party membership may provide a network of relationships that insulate 
and protect workers from lay-off. The effects of these factors on the probability of lay-off 
are estimated in the lay-off probit equation and reported below.  
It is also possible that enterprises are more willing to lay-off workers that have 
employed family members who can provide financial support to the laid-off worker than 
those who do not. Consequently, a variable representing the number of family members 
with paid employment is entered into the probit regression.  
Incentive schemes that tie productivity and/or effort to wages may lower 
employer costs relative to fixed-wage contracts and afford enterprises more flexibility in 
economic downturns. Therefore a set of dummy variables is used in the probit regression 
to control for those paid on piece rate or by the hour (as opposed to those on a fixed 
salary). 
Finally, it is possible that education and training affect the likelihood of lay-off 
partially or mainly through occupational channels--the majority of the laid-off workers 
are production line workers (see Table 1). To assess the effects of education and training 
on the probability of lay-off, net of occupation, I estimate a second set of lay-off probits 
with occupational dummy variables.  William Davidson Institute Working Paper 459 
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Factors Affecting the Probability of Re-Employment 
  One of the most important factors influencing the probability of re-employment is 
the state of the economy in the worker’s locality. The cities in our sample vary 
considerably in terms of economic well being with Xian, Wuhan, and Changchun trailing 
far behind Nanjing, Tianjin, and Beijing. This factor (health of the local economy) is 
controlled for by means of city dummy variables with Beijing as the base case.  
Personal productive characteristics should also be listed amongst the most 
important factors in predicting the likelihood of rehire. Therefore human capital variables 
(schooling, job training, and years of work experience) and health status variables (good 
health and poor health) are used as explanators. 
  It is possible that party membership provides a network/set of connections useful 
in finding work and a party-membership dummy is thus used to test this proposition. 
Gender and marital status are also controlled for in the re-employment probit estimation 
for reasons parallel to those explained above in the section on lay-offs.  
The effect of the duration of lay-off is tested by including in the probit equation a 
variable that represents the number of months that a worker has been laid-off. Workers 
without the support of either unemployment insurance or the income of other family 
members may be more inclined to accept early but less than ideal job offers than those 
with such support. 
  Sector dummies representing the ownership sector of the last job before lay off 
are used as independent variables in the probit to allow for the possibility that employers 
place differing values on the experience (and work habits and attitudes) gained in William Davidson Institute Working Paper 459 
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previous employment at an enterprise of a particular form of ownership. State ownership 
is the base case. 
Returns to Education – 
  Since industrial reform did not significantly influence urban enterprises until 
1984, Meng and Kidd’s (1997) estimates for 1981 can be considered as yielding returns 
to education in the pre-reform era. They reported a return to education of only 2.5 percent 
for men in the state-owned sector 
  As early as 1988, even though the rates of return for the employees in the state-
owned sector continued to be low (2.6 percent), the rates of return for new labor market 
entrants (6.4 percent) and for collective (4.1 percent) and private-sector workers (9.6 
percent) were higher and in the range that we find in East Asian market economies with 
smoothly functioning labor markets (Maurer-Fazio 1994). Given the extent of wage-
compression in pre-reform China, human capital accumulation is likely to be increasingly 
recognized and rewarded as the Chinese economic reforms progressed and market forces 
permeate the work place. Econometric analysis of data from the early and mid-1990s 
corroborates this expectation (Maurer-Fazio 1999, Knight and Song 1993, and Li and 
Gustafsson 1999).  
  Given the further incursion of market forces into the urban Chinese workplace in 
the late 1990s, it seems likely that we would observe further increases in the returns to 
investments in schooling and training. To the extent that the work place exhibits features 
of both the legacy of its pre-reform assignment and reward system and the post-reform 
market system, it is possible that the returns to education vary according to the degree of 
marketization. I thus hypothesize that workers who find their jobs through a competitive William Davidson Institute Working Paper 459 
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market means (as opposed to those who obtained their jobs through a non-market, 
uncompetitive mechanism) will have greater rewards to their human capital in general, 
and to their schooling in particular. 
  Of special interest here is the group of workers who have experienced a lay-off 
and then found new employment. Given that these workers have all found their new jobs 
in the post-reform period, to what extent are their productive characteristics rewarded?  
  The rewards to schooling here are calculated from Mincerian earnings functions. 
The dependent variable in the underlying regressions is the natural log of hourly earnings, 
which include wages, subsidies, and bonuses but do not take into account employer-
provided benefits such as medical insurance, pension accruals, or housing. The 
independent variables include years of schooling, years of work experience, the number 
of times a worker has changed his/her work unit (danwei), party membership, marital 
status, city of residence, enterprise ownership sector, health status, and payment method. 
The return to education is calculated and expressed in percentage terms by taking the 
coefficient on years of schooling from the Mincerian earnings function and multiplying it 
by 100. 
 
Empirical Results 
 
Probability of Lay-Off 
 
  Each of the posited factors (with the exception of marital status) significantly 
affect the likelihood of being laid-off. (See Table 2.) The marginal effect of an 
incremental year of schooling is a 2.6 percent reduction in the probability of lay-off. 
Keep in mind that each of the marginal effects here is based on a sample of firms that has 
chosen to lay off some of its workers while keeping others on the job. Employees who 
have received on-the-job training are 6.2 percent less likely to be laid off that those who William Davidson Institute Working Paper 459 
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have not received training. It appears that attachment to one’s employer provides a small 
measure of protection—each additional year spent at the current employer (danwei) 
reduces the chances of being chosen for lay-off by 0.39 percent. Being in good health as 
opposed to average health reduces the likelihood of lay-off by 4.2 percent. (Being in poor 
health appears to increase the probability of lay-off but is not significant at the 10 percent 
level.)  
(Insert Table 2 here.) 
The role of party membership in protecting workers from lay-off is larger than 
that of training—party membership reduces the probability of lay-off, ceteris paribus, by 
6.6 percent. There is an advantage to men in the lay-off process. Being male reduces 
one’s probability of layoff, ceteris paribus, by 2.5 percent. Marital status does not have a 
significant effect on the likelihood of being laid-off. Older workers are somewhat 
disadvantaged—the marginal effect of an increase in age of one year is an increase in the 
likelihood of layoff of 0.33 percent. Being on flexible payment schemes as opposed to 
being paid on a fixed salary reduces the likelihood of layoff quite significantly—by 6.6 
for those on piece rate and by 4.4 percent for those paid by the hour.  
Finally, the number of family members with paid employment significantly 
affects the likelihood of lay-off but not in the manner expected. Table 2 reveals a 
decrease in the probability of lay-off of 0.1 percent for each additional income-earning 
member in the family.  
Probability of Re-employment Once Laid-off 
  Schooling and job training stand out amongst the posited human capital factors 
predicted to affect the probability of re-employment once laid off. The marginal effect of William Davidson Institute Working Paper 459 
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an additional year of schooling is an increase in the probability of re-hire of close to 4 
percent. The marginal effect of a worker receiving training at his or her last job before 
being laid off is large—it increases the probability of re-hire by over 10 percent.  
(Insert Table 3 here.) 
  In terms of location, workers in Changchun and Wuhan have significantly lower 
probabilities of being rehired than workers in Beijing, with marginal effects of –13 and   
–11 percent, respectively. Surprisingly, given the poor state of the local economy, the 
coefficient on Xian, while negative, is insignificant. 
  The only other factor beside schooling, training and location that has a significant 
role in explaining the probability of being rehired is the duration of layoff. Each 
additional month since being laid off increases the likelihood of being rehired by 
approximately 0.4 percent. Party membership, years of work experience, gender, marital 
status, health status, the number of family members with paid employment, and whether 
the last job provided unemployment insurance all proved to be statistically insignificant 
in the estimated probit equation.  
Returns to Education 
  Table 4 reports three sets of returns to education based on Mincerian earnings 
functions that regress an individual’s natural log of hourly earnings on an array of 
explanatory variables that measure his or her schooling, work experience, and number of 
changes of employer as well as controlling for location, payment method, ownership 
sector and health status. 
(Insert Table 4 here.) William Davidson Institute Working Paper 459 
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  The first set of results reports returns to education for all of the continuously 
employed urban residents in our sample (that is, those not laid off by the firms that 
anchor the surveys). This set of workers is then divided first by gender, then by education 
level (high vs. low), and finally by whether the workers used a clearly competitive 
method to find their jobs as opposed to being either assigned to their position or being 
introduced by family members. 
  The coefficients on years of schooling in the underlying regressions were 
statistically significant for each of the groups in this first set. As revealed in Table 4 the 
returns vary from a low of 2.4 percent for the never laid-off females to a high of 5.5 
percent to those who found work competitively. The return for the group as a whole was 
3.5 percent. This low overall rate of return does not reflect the expected continuing trend 
of increasing recognition of human capital in remuneration determination. However, 
given the nature of this sample with its relatively high proportion of state-sector 
employees and over sampling of firms engaged in layoffs the result is not altogether 
surprising. 
  The second set of results deals with the same group of workers—the employed 
urban residents not laid off by the firms in our sample. This set of results differs from the 
first in that the underlying regressions control for firm by entering firm dummies in the 
regressions. (The controls for ownership sector and location are therefore necessarily left 
out.) These within firm estimates of returns to education are consistently lower than the 
across firm estimates and range from a low 2.3 percent for workers assigned to their jobs 
to a high of 3.2 percent for workers with 12 years or less schooling.  William Davidson Institute Working Paper 459 
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  The final set of results in Table 4 reports the returns to education experienced by 
workers who have been laid off and subsequently re-employed. The rewards to human 
capital accumulation appear to be greater for this group of urban workers (in arguably the 
most competitive sphere of China’s labor system) than for those who have never been 
laid off. The return to a year of schooling for the group is 4.5 percent with male rehired 
workers realizing a return of 7.1 percent and women 3.4 percent. Those who reported 
using a clearly competitive method of finding work have a return of 11.6 percent to an 
additional year of schooling. 
Conclusions 
 
  In urban China’s pre-reform labor system the State guaranteed workers a job. 
Wages were paid according to State-determined scales. Education was so poorly 
rewarded that some claim the pay scale exhibited a brain/brawn inversion. As the reforms 
proceeded, wage dispersion increased and market forces began to influence remuneration 
decisions. Never-the-less, out of apprehension about unemployment and social stability 
the Chinese leadership resisted giving enterprise managers the right to determine the size 
of their labor forces. In 1997 the leadership’s concerns about the inefficiency of state-
owned enterprises began to outweigh its worries about dealing with large numbers of 
unemployed urban workers. Workers were faced with the very real prospects of lay off 
and unemployment. Enterprises shed redundant workers in record numbers and, as 
mentioned above, by year’s end 1999 over 25 million workers had been placed on 
xiagang status. 
  The results of the above empirical analysis demonstrate that education has 
become a key determinant of labor market outcomes in China’s rapidly changing work William Davidson Institute Working Paper 459 
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environment. Education’s role is no longer restricted to its function in wage 
determination. Educational attainment is now an important factor in the lay-off 
decision—the more education a worker has the better his/ her protection from lay off. 
Similarly, the more education a worker has the better his/her chances of finding new 
employment once laid off. The education of re-employed workers, arguably those in the 
most competitive sphere of China’s urban labor system, is rewarded more, as measured in 
terms of incremental earnings for each additional year of schooling, than that of the 
continuously employed. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 459 
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Table 1-- Sample Means and Proportions, Chinese Urban Labor Markets 1999-2000
Urban Laid-off
Workers Male Female Workers Male Female
Urban W. Urban W. Laid-off Laid-off
Background PERSONAL INFORMATION
% Male 51.73 43.46
Age 40.29 40.32 40.26 39.20 39.95 38.62
%  Married 83.84 81.98 85.83 83.51 78.78 87.12
% Single 14.58 16.97 12.04 11.53 16.91 7.41
% Divorced 1.20 0.95 1.46 4.25 3.71 4.68
% Party members 12.28 13.06 11.43 2.26 3.86 1.03
% Youth League members 16.72 15.95 17.55 8.86 9.51 8.39
Years of schooling 11.67 11.58 11.82 10.57 10.42 10.68
Years working experience 19.14 20.31 17.88 20.01 20.84 19.39
Education % No formal education 0.05 0.11 0.00 0.19 0.30 0.11
% Junior primary (3 years and less) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.32 0.45 0.23
% Primary graduate 1.25 1.89 0.56 2.78 3.42 2.29
% Junior middle school graduate 22.74 26.32 18.92 35.08 40.48 30.81
% Technical and specialized highschool graduate 8.49 8.74 8.22 9.43 10.42 8.71
%. Senior middle school graduate 25.84 22.74 29.17 31.20 23.51 37.11
% Vocational highschool graduate 13.00 11.79 14.30 9.04 9.38 8.82
% Vocational college graduate 20.29 18.95 21.73 9.04 8.18 9.74
%  University graduate 8.16 9.37 6.87 2.84 3.72 2.18
%  Post-graduate graduate 0.16 0.11 0.23 0.06 0.15 0.00
CURRENT/LATEST JOB INFORMATION
Income (yuan) Monthly income from current/last job, of which* 552.68 575.77 528.25 416.50 438.67 399.16
    Salary 418.27 426.82 408.26 306.52 309.39 305.52
    Bonus 115.09 114.69 113.53 54.79 70.30 42.26
    Subsidy 83.79 88.79 78.43 51.44 54.61 48.57
    Income-in-kind 3.09 3.38 2.57
    Others 43.1 40.41 46.34 13.15 13.45 12.36
Hourly wage rate at current/last jog* 3.37 3.46 3.23 2.49 2.58 2.41
Monthly income from new job if laid off and rehired 571.00 627.10 535.20
Hourly wage rate at new job if laid off and rehired 3.10 3.22 3.03
Number of Hours and Days Worked Hours worked per day at current/last job* 8.13 8.24 8.01 7.99 8.03 7.96
Days worked per week at current/ last job* 5.32 5.39 5.26 5.45 5.48 5.44
Hours worked per day at new job if rehired 8.46 8.84 8.22
Days worked per week at new job if rehired 5.68 5.87 5.56
Job Training % received training 65.29 67.54 62.83 48.57 50.31 47.02
years worked at current/last enterprise* 15.51 16.31 14.67 15.91 16.78 15.25William Davidson Institute Working Paper 459 
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Table 1 Continued
Urban Laid-off
Workers Male Female Workers Male Female
Urban W. Urban W. Laid-off Laid-off
CURRENT/LAST JOB INFORMATION, CONT.*
Wage payment form % Piece rate 9.18 9.46 8.88 7.67 7.21 7.94
% Hourly 9.84 8.29 11.50 4.78 4.60 4.93
% Fixed wage 77.52 78.00 76.99 85.80 86.66 85.20
% Firm provides medical insurance 49.05 51.88 46.18 53.77 59.00 49.77
% Firm provides pension 85.96 86.4 85.65 76.15 78.61 74.37
% Firm provides unemployment insurance 53.81 51.88 53.36 37.79 41.00 35.37
Current working unit's ownership % State-owned  80.78 84.89 76.38 81.33 85.74 78.00
% Collective owned  11.78 9.44 14.29 10.54 7.06 13.13
% Joint venture 1.63 1.68 1.57 1.37 1.65 1.15
% Joint stock company 0.05 0.10 0.00 4.81 4.05 5.41
%  Privately owned 3.91 2.83 5.06 0.65 0.30 0.92
% Individually owned 1.36 0.73 2.02 0.46 0.45 0.46
Classification of current job % Cadre
% Permanent 58.31 59.91 56.59 70.53 69.51 71.22
% Contract 39.76 38.70 40.89 28.63 30.19 27.52
% Temporary 1.55 1.07 2.06 0.58 0.30 1.03
% Part-time
Position in current job %. Upper level cadre 1.74 2.10 1.35 0.32 0.75
% Middle level cadre 12.49 17.00 7.66 3.36 4.92 2.17
% Clerical/Office staff 28.14 22.25 34.46 14.60 9.84 18.31
% Engineer/Technician 9.29 10.91 7.55 5.88 8.64 2.17
%  Production line worker  40.74 40.71 40.77 65.76 68.26 63.73
% Service worker  3.86 3.67 4.05 6.59 4.17 8.47
%  Sales staff 1.58 1.68 1.46 2.39 2.53 2.29
Number of Observations Number of observations 1859 956 892 1564 678 882
* Information based on last job before lay-off for laid-off workers and on current job for all others.
Data Source: Urban Labor Market Integration ProjectWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 459 
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Table 2  Probit Model of the Probability of Lay Off
Probit Model with Firm Dummies Probit Model with Firm and Occupation Dummies 
Variable Marginal Standard  Z P>Z Variable Marginal Standard  Z
Effect % Error Effect % Error
years of schooling -2.598 0.003 -8.640 0.000 years of schooling -1.906 0.003 -5.960
years at latest danwei -0.392 0.001 -3.030 0.002 years at latest danwei -0.442 0.001 -3.180
age 0.334 0.001 2.430 0.015 age 0.520 0.001 3.470
male -2.495 0.014 -1.830 0.067 male -2.039 0.014 -1.430
married -2.920 0.021 -1.510 0.130 married -3.569 0.021 -1.830
party member -6.638 0.009 -3.930 0.000 party member -5.672 0.011 -2.990
good health -4.217 0.017 -2.710 0.007 good health -3.427 0.016 -2.260
poor health 3.568 0.035 1.170 0.241 poor health 3.474 0.035 1.150
received job training -6.170 0.015 -4.330 0.000 received job training -5.695 0.015 -4.020
# of family members employed -0.103 0.000 -2.330 0.020 # of family members employed -0.122 0.000 -2.860
piece rate -6.638 0.010 -3.990 0.000 piece rate -7.294 0.008 -5.030
hourly pay -4.436 0.019 -1.740 0.081 hourly pay -5.547 0.014 -2.500
(firm dummies suppressed) (firm and occupation dummies suppressed)
Log Likelihood -631.770 Log Likelihood -601.030
Wald Chi2(93) 1834.200 Wald Chi2(100) 1720.42
Prob > Chi2 0.000 Prob > Chi2 0.0000
Number of Observations 2246 Number of Observations 2237
Base case: Single female who did not receive job training   Base case: Single female production worker who did not receive job 
and who is of average health and paid a fixed salary. training and who is of average health and paid a fixed salary.
Data Source: Urban Labor Market Integration ProjectWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 459 
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Table 3 -- Probit Model for the Probability of Finding Work Once Laid Off
Variable Marginal Standard  Z P>Z
Effect % Error
Years of schooling 3.71 0.008 4.87 0.000
Years of work experience 0.38 0.008 0.47 0.642
Experience squared -0.02 0.000 -0.87 0.383
Duration of unemployment (months) 0.42 0.001 4.50 0.000
Received training at last job 10.36 0.035 2.98 0.003
Male 5.73 0.036 1.60 0.109
Married -2.29 0.050 -0.46 0.648
Party Member -2.61 0.110 -0.24 0.813
Good health -4.77 0.036 -1.34 0.182
Poor Health -3.24 0.067 -0.48 0.633
Last job provided unemploy.ins. -1.31 0.036 -0.36 0.719
Tianjin 5.16 0.065 0.80 0.424
Nanjing 1.65 0.062 0.27 0.788
Xian -7.23 0.068 -1.04 0.299
Changchun -13.39 0.065 -1.95 0.051
Wuhan -10.92 0.061 -1.73 0.083
Last employer collective ownership 7.05 0.059 1.21 0.226
Last employer joint venture 9.80 0.072 1.38 0.167
Last employer private enterprise 32.17 0.238 1.18 0.238
# of family members employed -0.02 0.002 -0.10 0.924
Log Likelihood -597.703
LR Chi2 (20) 75.540
Prob > Chi2 0.000
Number of Observations 939
Base case: Single female who is not a party member and did not receive job training  
and is of average health and was formerly employed by a state-owned enterprise. 
Data Source: Urban Labor Market Integration ProjectWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 459 
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 Table 4--Rates of Return to Years of Formal Schooling in Urban Chinese Labor Markets 1999-2000
Without Firm Dummies
Sector Returns* Significance No.of Obs.
%
Workers with Urban Residence Permit
(Without Enterprise Controls)
All Urban Workers 3.5 0.000 1359
Urban Males 4.4 0.000 796
Urban Females 2.4 0.001 754
Urban Workers > 12 years of schooling 3.3 0.032 532
Urban Workers <= 12 years of schooling 3.7 0.000 1018
Urban Workers--competitively found jobs 5.5 0.000 453
Urban Workers assigned jobs  3.0 0.000 1090
Workers with Urban Residence Permit
(Controlling for Enterprise)
All Urban Workers 2.9 0.000 1361
Urban Males 2.9 0.000 798
Urban Females 2.6 0.000 756
Urban Workers > 12 years of schooling 1.8 0.174 532
Urban Workers <= 12 years of schooling 3.2 0.000 1022
Urban Workers--competitively found jobs 3.0 0.001 454
Urban Workers assigned jobs  2.3 0.000 1093
Rehired Laid-Off Workers**
All Rehired Workers 4.5 0.002 338
Rehired Males 7.1 0.001 129
Rehired Females 3.4 0.082 209
Rehired Workers > 12 years of schooling 1.1 0.851 55
Rehired Workers <= 12 years of schooling 2.9 0.161 283
Rehired Workers--competitively found jobs 11.6 0.024 70
Rehired Workers introduced to their jobs 4.4 0.004 258
*Returns to schooling here are expressed as percentages which are calculated as the coefficients on years of schooling in the
Mincerian earnings functions multiplied by 100. 
The dependent variable in the underlying regressions is the natural log of hourly earnings which include wages, subsidies, 
and bonuses but do not take into account employer-provided benefits such as medical insurance, pension accruals, or housing.
The independent variables include years of schooling, years of work experience, number of times changed danwei 
party membership, marital status, city of residence, enterprise ownership sector, health status, and payment method.
** The number of Danwei changes was not recorded for laid-off workers and is therefore excluded from the list of regressors. 
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